chaplaincies has been questioned by more recent decisions of the Supreme Court — or any other court for that matter. Accordingly, plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim should be dismissed.7 II.    PLAINTIFFS ARTICLE VI CLAIMS SHOULD ALSO BE DISMISSED
In addition to his Establishment Clause challenge, plaintiff also asserts three claims challenging the congressional chaplaincies under Article VI of the Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the historical selection oftheists as Senate and House Chaplains violates the religious test prohibition. Art. VI, cl. 3, see Compl. ^ 47-66, and that various statements the Chaplains have made violate the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, see Compl. ^ 67-70, and the oath taken by the Chaplains under Art. VI, cl. 3, see Compl. \ 71.
While those claims seek to invoke different constitutional provisions from plaintiff's Establishment Clause challenge, they are equally lacking in merit and should be dismissed on several grounds. First, because plaintiff lacks standing to raise his Article VI challenges, the Court is without jurisdiction over those claims. In addition, plaintiffs religious test oath claim must be dismissed because it raises a non-justiciable political question regarding the selection of officers by the Senate and House, and implicates the Speech or Debate immunity of Members of Congress in electing their officers. Finally, even if plaintiff could overcome those jurisdictional
7 Because the principles of stare decisis foreclose plaintiffs Establishment Clause claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we do not discuss here any other bases for dismissal of that claim. Nonetheless, for reasons stated by the United States, see United States Brief at 8-16, which we incorporate by reference here, another reason plaintiffs Establishment Clause claim should be dismissed is that he lacks standing to bring it. Because both grounds are jurisdictional, the Court may dismiss based on either. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89; id. at 115 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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