Id. at 228.9 Similarly here, it is the Senate's and House's actions pursuant to their power to choose their officers and to determine the rules of their proceedings that are the focus of plaintiffs Article VI challenges, not the congressional enactments authorizing and appropriating money to pay the salary of the Chaplains. Hence, plaintiff's Article VI challenge does not meet the first prong of the Flast test.
Plaintiffs Article VI claims also fail to meet the second prong of Flast, which limits taxpayer standing to Establishment Clause claims. The Supreme Court in Flast stated that a taxpayer challenge must allege that the challenged congressional enactment under the tax and spending power exceeded "specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power." Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03. The D.C. Circuit and other courts have expressly recognized that the Supreme Court has never expanded taxpayer standing outside of the specific circumstances at issue in Flast - an Establishment Clause challenge to a specific exercise of Congress' Article I, § 8 spending power. See District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The [Supreme] Court has never recognized federal taxpayer standing outside the[] narrow facts [of Flast};'); Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849,852 (8th Cir. 2002) (Supreme Court "has never found any other constitutional provision [outside of Establishment Clause] that satisfies Flosi'^.petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Oct. 24,2002)(02-645); Tarsneyv. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929,
9 Similarly, in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, plaintiff brought a mandamus action against the Secretary of the Treasury to force the United States to provide an accounting of the receipts and expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency pursuant to Article I, § 9, cl. 7 ("... a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."). The Court found that plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing because his suit did not challenge an exercise of Congress' tax and spending power, despite the relationship between a statement of the accounts and congressional spending, but rather challenged the statutes regulating the Central Intelligence Agency. 418 U.S. at 174-75.
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