points out, numerous Members of Congress expressed their disagreement with the Ninth Circuit' s decision regarding the pledge of allegiance. See id., appendix VI. To claim that he suffered a particularized injury to a legally cognizable interest each time a government official expressed even an indirect disagreement with the decision of the court of appeals in plaintiffs other lawsuit stretches the concept of standing to the point where it has no meaning at all.12
Second, the asserted "personal reproach" injury also fails the causation prong of standing. The named individual defendants in this suit are the disbursing officers of the House and Senate. Plaintiffs "reproach" injury, however, allegedly resulted from the Senate Chaplain's June 27 prayer. That injury is not fairly traceable to the named defendants, who disburse the Chaplain's salary, but rather to the independent action of a third party, the Chaplain, who is not before the Court. Therefore, plaintiffs "reproach" injury fails to satisfy the causation element of standing. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) ("[Tjhe 'case or controversy' limitation of Art. in... requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.").
For similar reasons, plaintiffs alleged "personal reproach" injury also fails the final part of the standing test - redressability. Plaintiff has sued various administrative officers of Congress challenging the salary payments made to the House and Senate Chaplains. However, even if plaintiff received a favorable decision on the merits, relief against these officers, such as
12 Plaintiffs allegation that the Chaplain's prayer somehow "demean[edj his religious beliefs," Compl. 193, is nothing more than an intangible stigmatic harm that is insufficient to establish an injury in fact for standing purposes. SeeKurtz, 829 F.2d at 1141 ("[Allegations of stigmatic injury will not suffice to link a plaintiff personally to the conduct he challenges unless... the plaintiff personally has been denied a benefit.").
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