enjoining future salary payments to the Chaplain, would not redress the alleged personal reproach from the June 27,2002 prayer.13
In sum, plaintiffs alleged "personal reproach" injury fails to satisfy any of the Lujan prerequisites and, thus, does not provide him with standing to raise Article VI claims.
3.     Plaintiff's Alleged Employment Injury Does Not Provide Him With Article III Standing.
Plaintiffs final allegation of harm is based on a claim of injury arising out of his supposed "application" for appointment as the Senate or House Chaplain. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he "applied for the position of legislative chaplain in both the Senate and the House," Compl. H 75, and that "it is clear that [plaintiff] - due solely to his religious beliefs - will be discriminated against, and that his candidacy for either of these governmental positions will not even be seriously considered." Id. ^ 76. These allegations are facially insufficient to establish standing under Article in.
First, plaintiffs allegations of "employment discrimination" do not establish an injury-in-fact to any legally cognizable interest. Plaintiff alleges that he "will not even be seriously considered" for the Senate or House chaplaincy, and thus will be denied a "government position." Compl. U 76. But the essence of plaintiff s suit is that the Senate and House Chaplaincies are unconstitutional, see, e.g., id. at 17, Prayer ^ IV, that the primary role of such offices - offering
13 Indeed, plaintiffs "personal reproach" injury has no connection to the constitutional claims that he raises in his complaint. Rather, his allegations concerning a personal reproach from the June 27,2002 prayer appear, at most, to be an attempt to allege a common law tort claim against the Chaplain. Such a claim not only would be without merit, but also would have to be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, after exhausting administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. Plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies imposes a jurisdictional barrier to treating his allegations as such a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675; see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,111-13 (1993).
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