House Chaplains as defendants failed causation prong of standing with regards to injury from the denial of request to speak as "guest chaplain" on the floor of House or Senate, as only Members of House and Senate can grant floor privileges, not the chaplains, and thus any injury was caused by parties not before the court).
Similarly, as none of the named Senate and House defendants can remove the current Chaplains or elect plaintiff Senate or House Chaplain, a favorable decision by the Court would not redress plaintiffs alleged employment injury. Moreover, because the selection of officers is a power textually committed to each House by the Constitution, see Section n.B. infra, the Court lacks authority either to remove the current Chaplains, to order the Senators or Representatives to elect plaintiff as Chaplain, or to prescribe what qualifications may or may not be considered by Senators or Representatives in choosing their Chaplains.   Accordingly, plaintiffs "employment discrimination" claim is not subject to redress by the Court.15
In sum, none of the three injuries plaintiff asserts is sufficient to provide him standing to raise any Article VI claims, and the Court should therefore dismiss those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
15 The fact that plaintiff has named the "Congress of the United States" as a defendant does not alleviate the causation and redressability deficiencies in his standing. Each House of Congress is charged by separate provisions of the Constitution with the power to choose its own officers, see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2 (House) and art. 1, § 3 (Senate), and the House and Senate independently elect their respective Chaplain, without any bicameral action. Moreover, Congress as a body is immune from suit, see Keener v. Congress of the United States, 467 F.2d 952,953 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of suit because Congress "is protected from suit by sovereign immunity"); Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D.D.C. 1959) ("[T]he Federal courts may not issue an injunction or a writ of mandamus against the Congress."), except as it expressly consents to be sued, see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (stating that "waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed");
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,4 (1969) (waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed"). Thus Congress itself cannot be considered a defendant for purposes of analyzing the causation or redressability of plaintiff s alleged injuries.
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