the selection of officers of the Senate and the House to the discretion of those bodies. Compare U.S. Const. art. n, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause) with U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2 & 3 (empowering each House of Congress to choose its officers). Accordingly, plaintiff's challenge to the basis upon which each House has selected its Chaplain is a non-justiciable political question that is textually committed to the Senate and House.18
Furthermore, adjudicating plaintiff's Article VI religious test claim would, of necessity, enmesh the Court in the Senate's and House's selection of their officers and require it to judge the motives and considerations of Senators and Representatives in making their choice. That intrusion on the Senate's and House's internal procedures would place the Judicial Branch in a position of overseeing the organization and selection of Legislative Branch officers, and would demonstrate a lack of the respect due that coordinate branch. See Murray v. Morton, 505 F. Supp. at 147, vacated on other grounds, 720 F.2d 689.
18 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), in which the Supreme Court found justiciable the House of Representative's exclusion of one of its Members, is distinguishable from the instant case. The Court in Powell found that the Constitution set forth three qualifications for Members of the House - age, residency, citizenship - that constitute the only qualifications that can be imposed on membership in the House. 395 U.S. at 547-50. In excluding Congressman-elect Adam Clayton Powell, the House had specifically noted that those qualifications were met, but that Powell was excluded on other grounds. Id. at 489, 511-12. hi reviewing Powell's exclusion, the Supreme Court held that, while the Constitution committed to the House the power to judge the qualifications of its Members, the House could not impose qualifications beyond those expressly set forth in the Constitution. Thus, the House's exclusion of Powell for reasons other than age, residency, and citizenship did not constitute a political question, as such power had not been textually committed to the House. Id. at 547-48. The Court specifically noted, however, that the power to judge whether a given Congressman-elect had in fact met the three qualifications provided for in the Constitution is likely a matter textually committed to the House and not subject to judicial review. See id. at 521 n.42, 548. Unlike the specifically listed qualifications for membership in the House, there are no express qualifications constraining the Senate's or House's selection of their officers, and thus there is a complete, textual commitment of that power to those bodies.
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