BACKGROUND
1.    Legal Background
The precise claims plaintiff raises have been either expressly or implicitly rejected on the merits in two decisions controlling on this court: Marsh v. Chambers. 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Murray v. Buchanan. 720 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1983) fen bane). While plaintiff addresses Marsh in his Complaint, asking this Court to declare that the Supreme Court's decision has been "overruled," see Compl. at p. 17 (point III), he does not mention Murray, or Kurtz v. Baker. 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987). cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1059 (1988), another D.C. Circuit decision directly relevant to his claims. We briefly discuss each of these cases below.
a. Marsh v. Chambers. Marsh squarely rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State.' See 463 U.S. at 795. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the experience of the National Congress. See 463 U.S. at 786-92. As the Court noted, the First Congress early on "adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with prayer," id. at 788, and passed a statute providing for the payment of congressional chaplains three days before final agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights. Summing up this early experience, the Court stated (id,):
[cjlearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.
'The plaintiff in Marsh was a state senator. In a brief footnote, the Court found the senator had standing to raise an Establishment Clause challenge "as a member of the legislature and as a taxpayer whose taxes are used to fund the chaplaincy." 463 U.S. at 786 n.4. We explain in Part I.B infra why the Court's conclusion on standing does not control Mr. Newdow's claims.
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