Plaintiff seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief.5 With respect to the former, plaintiff seeks a declaration that Congress's chaplaincy practice violates three constitutional provisions: (i) the First Amendment, because Congress's practice allegedly constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion; see Compl. at ^ 31-46 & p. 17 (point I); (ii) Article VI's ban on "religious tests" for public office, because "the position of congressional chaplain is available only to theists";6 see ui_ at ^ 47-66 & p. 17 (point II); and (iii) the Supremacy Clause, because congressional chaplains allegedly "repeatedly.. . contendQ that God and God's law reigns supreme in this Nation." See id. at^ffl 67-71 & p. 17 (point IV).7 He also asks the Court to "recognize" that the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh "has been overruled." See id at p. 17 (point ffl). Finally, plaintiff seeks to enjoin the congressional officer defendants "from making any disbursements - in salary or otherwise - relative to the office of congressional chaplain." Compl. at p. 18 (point VI).8
although the Complaint does not cite the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, we assume that statute is the basis for the declaratory relief plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under the federal mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
'The Religious Test Clause provides that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3.
Belatedly, plaintiff seeks a declaration that a statement on the Senate Chaplain's website violates the constitutional oath (or affirmation) all officers of the United States take (or make) "to support th[e] Constitution." See Compl. at ^ 70-71 & p. 18 (point V).
'All of plaintiffs claims seek relief against Congress and/or its officers. While Congress is, of course, part of the "United States," Congress is representing its own interests in this case. The United States was named as a defendant, however, and has an undeniable interest in this suit, see 28 U.S.C. § 517 (authorizing the Attorney General to "attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States"), particularly in light of plaintiff's claim that the federal statutes relating to chaplain pay are unconstitutional. See. e.g.. Compl. at ^ 82-85.
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