process, there is no "relief they can provide to "remedy" plaintiffs "injury" (i.e.. his fear that his application will not be "seriously considered" because he is a non-theist). See Compl. at ^ 76. Plaintiff, of course, is not even seeking relief that would redress this "injury" - he is seeking to have Congress's chaplaincy program declared unconstitutional. See id. at pp. 17-18. But plaintiff cannot manufacture standing based on an "injury" for which he seeks no redress. For all of these reasons, plaintiffs allegation relating to his application for chaplain cannot establish standing.
B.    Plaintiff Cannot Establish Taxpayer Standing
Plaintiff asserts taxpayer standing based on the fact his federal income taxes (which plaintiff alleges he pays) are "used to pay for the Congressional Chaplains, their staff and their offices." See Compl. ^ 86. Plaintiffs status as a federal taxpayer, however, is not an appropriate basis for standing in this case.
Plaintiff is correct (Compl. at ^ 87) that the general rule against federal taxpayer standing, see Frothingham v. Mellon. 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923), is subject to a "narrow exception" in certain types of Establishment Clause cases. See Bowen v. Kendrick. 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988).
\
Specifically, under the Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83 (1968), a plaintiff can demonstrate federal taxpayer standing by showing two elements: (i) that the challenged government action is an "exerciser of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution"; Flast. 392 U.S. at 102; and (ii) that "the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power." Id; at 102-03.
-10-