None of plaintiff s claims satisfies this test." Plaintiffs claims under Article VI and the Supremacy Clause fail Flasfs first prong because neither claim challenges any exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power.'2 They fail the second prong because neither Article VI nor the Supremacy Clause constitutes an independent limitation on Congress's taxing and spending power. See Fulani v. Bradv. 935 F.2d 1324, 1326-27 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Flast exception applies to "cases involving the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment"), cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1048 (1992); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618.
As for plaintiffs Establishment Clause claim, it also fails Flast's first prong. It is true, of course, that this claim challenges Congress's authority to pay chaplain salaries. See Compl. at . ^ 82-87; see also 2 U.S.C. § 61d (authorizing compensation of Senate chaplain). But Congress's power to pay chaplain salaries derives not from its power to tax and spend, but from its power to choose its officers, coupled with its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
"Flasfs two-part test is applied with "rigor" by the Supreme Court. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, me.. 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982). Accordingly, the Court has consistently rejected claims of federal taxpayer standing where the plaintiff challenged no exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power. See Schlessinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War. 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (no standing where plaintiffs "did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch m permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status"); United States v. Richardson. 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (no standing where plaintiffe' challenge "[was] not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA"); Valley Forge. 454 U.S. at 480 (no standing where the challenged government action "was not an exercise of authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8").
^Plaintiffs Article VI claim - that Congress effectively has limited the position of chaplain to "theists" - challenges Congress's authority to choose its officers and employees, not its power to tax and spend. See Kurtz. 829 F.2d at 829 F.2d at 1140 (no taxpayer standing to challenge "internal practices of each house of Congress") (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs Supremacy Clause claim - that congressional chaplains unlawfully have asserted that "God's law reigns supreme" - challenges the actions of chaplains, not of Congress.
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