Not every congressional expenditure is an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending authority.13 For example, the taxing and spending power is not implicated by an "incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." Flast. 392 U.S. at 102. Moreover, and most importantly here, "Congress need not draw authority from [the Taxing and Spending Clause] if another constitutional provision confers the power to spend for a specific purpose." Richardson v. Kennedy. 313 F.Supp. 1282, 1285 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (three-judge court) (taxpayer lacks standing to challenge congressional pay raise enacted under authority of Article I, § 6, cl. 11. affd mem.. 401 U.S. 901 (1971'). As the Richardson court explained, where federal spending has a constitutional basis independent of the Taxing and Spending Clause, taxpayer standing is not available.'4 See id. at 1285-86.
"The taxing and spending power provides constitutional authority for "federal taxing and spending programs." Flast 392 U.S. at 101. Such "programs" involve Congress's attempt to promote the "general welfare," U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, by the '"expenditure of public moneys for public purposes ... not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.'" South Dakota v. Dole. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the taxing and spending power has been held only to authorize quintessential spending programs, such as providing federal funds to local agencies for the education of low-income families; Flast 392 U.S. at 86; or providing federal grants to public or nonprofit private organizations to help prevent teen pregnancy. See Bowen. 487 U.S. at 593. Even putting aside the standing problems discussed in the text, it is hard to see how the relatively minor amount of money allocated for chaplain salaries, see. e.g.. 2 U.S.C. § 6 Id, can qualify as a spending "program."
"'Accord Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan. 786 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1986) (no taxpayer standing to challenge ambassadorship to Vatican because spending was authorized by Congress's power over foreign affairs), cert. denied. 479 U.S. 914 (1986); Velvel v. Nixon. 415 F.2d 236,239 (10th Cir. 1969) (no taxpayer standing to challenge Vietnam War expenditures because expenditures were authorized by Congress's power "to raise and support Armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy"), cert. denied. 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). But see Katcoffv. Marsh. 582 F.Supp. 463, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing taxpayer standing to challenge constitutionality of Army chaplaincy program notwithstanding the government's argument that funding for chaplaincy program was based on Congress's war powers; "a federal court should not attempt to divine whether a particular statute authorizing spending is enacted
-12-