Thus, even if paying chaplain salaries could be deemed a spending "program," but see n.l3 supra, the constitutional basis for chaplain salaries is grounded in each House's express constitutional authority to "choose" its officers, see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House officers), id. at Art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (Senate officers), coupled with Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. at Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The power to choose officers plainly carries with it the power to pay those officers. As Judge MacKinnon stated in his special concurrence in Murray: "[pjayment of the chaplains, in short, is clearly concomitant to Congress' constitutionally prescribed right to choose those officers in the first instance." Murray. 720 F.2d at 692 (MacKinnon, J-, concurring specially). Cf. Lichter v. United States. 334 U.S. 742, 778-79 (1948) ("[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes"); Boske v. Comingore. 177 U.S. 459, 467-69 (1900) (Congress has authority to regulate the actions of Treasury employees pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, combined with Congress's direct authority under Article I to provide for the collection of taxes).
Indeed, taxpayer standing would be particularly inappropriate here because plaintiff is challenging Congress's conduct of its internal affairs. See Alien v. Wright. 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("the law of Art. HI standing is built on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers"). The Constitution textually commits to Congress the exclusive power to select its officers and establish rules for its proceedings. See U.S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 5; id_ at Art. I, § 3,
under the Taxing and Spending Clause, or under some other, arguably appropriate, source of Congressional power"), affd 755 F.2d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 1985) (no significant discussion of district court's standing decision). Katcoff plainly is inconsistent with Richardson, which, given the Supreme Court's summary affirmance, see 401 U.S. 901 (1971), is controlling. See Hicks v. Miranda. 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (summary affirmance has precedential and binding effect on lower courts).
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