cl. 5; id at Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. It would be inappropriate, and inconsistent with the respect which courts owe the coordinate branches of government, for this Court to resolve questions relating to Congress's internal governance based on nothing more than a taxpayer complaint. Cf. Murray v. Buchanan. 720 F.2d at 691-99 (MacKinnon J., concurring specially) (concluding, for similar reasons, that a taxpayer challenge to Congress's chaplaincy program presented a nonjusticiable political question).15
The United States acknowledges (see n.l supra) that, in a brief footnote in Marsh, the Supreme Court found standing based on plaintiffs status "as a member of the legislature and as a taxpayer whose taxes are used to fund the chaplaincy." See 463 U.S. at 786 n.4 (emphasis added). This holding does not apply here for three reasons. First, Mr. Newdow is not a Member of Congress, and thus does not have to confront personally the practice of prayer by congressional chaplains. Second, as the D.C. Circuit has noted. Marsh involved an Establishment Clause claim by a state taxpayer to state expenditures. See Dist. of Columbia Common Cause v. Dist. of Columbia. 858 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784-85. State and municipal taxpayer suits are not subject to the same standing limitations as federal taxpayer suits. See Dist. of Columbia Common Cause. 858 F.2d at 4-6. Third, because Marsh involved a state practice, standing did not raise any of the federal separation-of-powers concerns raised here.
Finally, the United States also acknowledges that, in Murray, a divided panel of the D.C.
"Whether viewed under the rubric of standing or political question (and either doctrine could be appropriate here), this Court plainly should be reluctant to adjudicate questions relating to Congress's conduct of its internal affairs. The United States expressly adopts and incorporates by reference the Congressional Defendants' political question argument. See Congressional Defendants' Brief at 28-31.
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