1	and particularized and (b) "actual or imminent,' not
2	"conjectural' or "hypothetical.'" Lujan v. Defenders of
3	Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).
4	An alleged injury to an interest "which is held in common by all
5	members of the public" is not the sort of " [c]oncrete injury,
6	whether actual or threatened" which "is that indispensable
7	element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form
8	traditionally capable of judicial resolution." Schlesinger v.
9	Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21
10	(1974); See also, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743
11	(1995).
12	Newdow does not recite any concrete and particularized
13	injury as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional recitation
14	of a prayer at President Bush's inauguration. While it is
15	apparent that Newdow was offended by the prayer, this falls far
16	short of an actual concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.
17	Newdow does not seek damages in this action, but does seek
18	to recover his costs associated with bringing this action such as
19	expert witness fees and attorney fees. Complaint, Prayer, ^ III.
20	Accordingly, he may argue that by incurring these costs
21	associated with commencing this litigation, he has suffered
22	damage for the purpose of satisfying the requirement that he have
23	a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. However, to
24	have standing, "[t]he litigation must give the plaintiff some
25	other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct
26	of the litigation itself." Steel Company v. Citizens for a
27	Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1020
28	(1998). Newdow's complaint fails to identify what tangible
	5