constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare.
454 U.S. at 485-86, 102 S. Ct. at 766-767.
Nonetheless, when a person alleges that he has avoided, or will avoid, public places or services on account of an "offensive" religious symbol or statement, the courts have found that the personal exposure to the religious symbol/statement is unlike the remote after-the-fact exposure in Valley Forge and is sufficient to confer standing. American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverlv Hills. 90 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1996) (persons who avoided public park because of religious symbol had standing); Hewitt v. Joyner. 940 F.2d 1561, 1564 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); c/Doe v. Madison School Dist. No. 321. 177 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (parent lacked standing to protest school prayer at graduation because she had no students remaining in the school district and did not allege that she would attend future graduations.) I              Defendant asserts that plaintiffs "electronic exposure" in lieu of personal appearance at the inaugural festivities makes all tlie difference in the standing equation. Defendant appears to concede that if plaintiff had alleged that he had heard the prayer in person he would have standing. However, the Presidential inauguration is a historic event of national importance to which the public is invited, if not encouraged, to view on television. Defendant cites to no authority that one cannot be offended in the First Amendment sense by speech transmitted by electronic means as opposed to an in-the-place sensory hearing. Moreover, defendant's distinction would pose arbitrary and unworkable standards. What would be the case if a person attended the inauguration in person, but was located so far away that the president was only a speck on the horizon, and he could only "hear" and "see" the president by means of an electronically transmitted simulcast of the speech imposed on a remote screen and speaker system? Defendant's "in person" standing requirement is unknown to the law. "This is because [First Amendment] speech is often disseminated by print and electronics, rather than by standing in front of people and talking to them." Finlev v. National Endowment for the Arts. 100 F.3d