programming he found offensive, concluding that Newdow's exposure to offensive material broadcast over the airwaves gave him standing.  F&R, p. 5.  However, the Magistrate Judge cited no case that holds that anyone viewing a televised event has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the event. Instead, the Magistrate Judge quotes a line from Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1996)(Kleinfeld, J. dissenting), rev. on other grounds, 524 U.S. 569, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (1998) in support of his broad view of standing. 3  However, the quote was taken out of context.  The quote related to how a public forum can be created, not to the entirely different issue of who has standing to file a lawsuit. Finley, at 686.
Moreover, the Magistrate Judge's broad view of the standing requirement completely eviscerates long-standing principles that one seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must show that he has suffered an "...'injury in fact' --an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) "actual or imminent,' not  "conjectural' or  "hypothetical.'"  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).  An alleged injury to an interest "which is held in common by all members of the public" is not the sort of "[c]oncrete injury, whether actual or
3    "Defendant's "in person" standing requirement is unknown to the law.  'This is because [First Amendment] speech is often disseminated by print and electronics, rather than by standing in front of people and talking to them.' Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 f.3d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1996)(Kleinfeld, J. dissenting)."  F&R at 5-6.