current public opinion polls, this Court cannot assume that he will be reelected.  Moreover, while history suggests that it highly likely that a prayer will be given at the next inauguration, one can only speculate concerning the identity of the person chosen to deliver the prayer or the content of the prayer.  What will happen in 2005 is strictly the subject of speculation.  Newdow's assertion that the 2005 inaugural prayer will be the same as the 2001 prayer is entirely speculative and insufficient for Article III standing.
Newdow also lacks standing to obtain declaratory relief. Like those who seek injunctive relief, plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief must satisfy the requirement that there be "continuing, present adverse effects."  Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).  A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must also establish the likelihood of future substantial and immediate irreparable harm. Hodgers-Durgin v. DeLaVina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting O'SAea).
Newdow cannot show that he is any danger of suffering immediate, irreparable harm.  Indeed, all he alleged in the Complaint is that he watched the inauguration on television on January 20, 2001, almost 11 month ago.  Complaint, H 26.  Nowhere does Newdow allege that he still suffers some adverse effect from the January 20, 2001 prayer.   And like the unsuccessful plaintiff in Lyons, many months have passed since the allegedly unconstitutional conduct without the reoccurrence of the violation. This is fatal to Newdow's standing to request equitable relief because as O'Shea and Lyons instruct, allegations of past injury with no present adverse effects are
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