prayer, this Court should not allow Newdow to object on their behalf.  Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-114.  "[T]he mere fact that the constitutional rights of third parties may be in jeopardy provides no justification for judicial intervention." Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L.Rev. 423, 429 (1974), quoted in Cole, 228 F.2d at 1099.
Finally, as for the third elements necessary for third-party standing, Newdow has not shown that any obstacle prevents theistic non-Christians from mounting their own challenge to Christian-oriented inaugural prayer.
D.   THE RECITATION OF A CHRISTIAN PRAYER AT THE
INAUGURATION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY THE DRAFTERS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTENDED TO PROHIBIT.
Even assuming this Court finds that Newdow has both Article III and prudential standing, summary judgment should be granted because Reverend Graham's prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Chief Justice Burger's historical analysis of legislative and inaugural prayer in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) bears repeating here.
Chief Justice Burger first observed that as early as 1774, the Continental Congress opened its sessions with a prayer offered by a paid chaplain.  Jd, at 787.  In addition, one of the first items of business for the First Congress was to adopt a policy regarding the selection of a chaplain to open each session with a prayer.  Jd. at 788-789.  Of significance to the Supreme Court was the fact that on September 25, 1779, three days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains, final
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