the Establishment Clause.  But plaintiff has offered absolutely no support for this reading of the Establishment Clause.  As Justice Douglas observed in upholding a state statute allowing public school children to be released from school attendance to attend religious classes:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated.  As so far as interference with the "free exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of religion are concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. . . . The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. . . . That is the common sense of the matter.  Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other--hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.  Churches could not be required to pay property taxes.  Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. . . .Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths--these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment.  A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."
ZoracA v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1952)(emphasis added). Clearly the Supreme Court did not view "appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive" to be an establishment of religion, nor has any other court since then gone so far.
The "common sense" of the instant case is that religious speech at a Presidential inauguration, whether delivered by the President himself or by an invited guest, is not a "law" and does not violate the Establishment Clause.  And the issuance of an