injunction banning similar speech at future inaugurations would demonstrate the hostility toward religion against which Justice Douglas cautioned.
II.  REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations are little more than a restatement of legal arguments the Magistrate Judge has already considered and rejected.  However, President Bush will respond to specific objections plaintiff raises.
First, plaintiff's reliance on Youagstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) to support his argument that this Court can enjoin the President of the United States is misplaced. In Youngstown the President issued an Executive Order authorizing the seizure of steel mills.  The Supreme Court held that the President had exceeded his powers under Article II of the Constitution.  Zd., at 632.  Here, of course, President Bush issued no order requiring any government action to occur. At bottom, plaintiff seeks to stifle any religious-oriented speech the President may give in the course of his official duties.  But such speech is not a law nor does it have any legal force.  The Magistrate Judge correctly recognized that in general the Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-803 (1992). This limitation on this Court's jurisdiction must also mean that no Court can dictate the role that the President plays in connection with his inauguration.
Second, in arguing that President Bush's purported violation of the First Amendment lies outside the scope of his "official
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